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The last reason for satkåryavåda 
(Published in: Harånandalahar¥. Volume in Honour of Professor Minoru Hara on his Seventieth Birthday. Ed. 
Ryutaro Tsuchida and Albrecht Wezler. Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wezler. 2000. Pp. 53-62) 
 
This modest contribution to the volume in honour of Professor Minoru HARA contains a 
supplementary observation to the lecture which, at his invitation, I had the pleasure of 
giving at the International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo in May 1996, and which 
became the basis for a series of lectures (Paris 1997) that have now been published under 
the title Langage et réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne (BRONKHORST, 1999). 
This note is not based on new independent research, but has been inspired by and draws 
upon Professor Phyllis GRANOFF's contribution to the conference on Såµkhya and Yoga 
(Lausanne 1998) which too has now been published (GRANOFF, 1999). 
 The Såµkhyakårikå justifies the doctrine of satkåryavåda in kårikå 9, which reads: 
 
asadakaraˆåd upådånagrahaˆåt sarvasambhavåbhåvåt/ 
ßaktasya ßakyakaraˆåt kåraˆabhåvåc ca sat kåryam //9// 
 
This kårikå contains five arguments, the last of which concerns us at present. It reads, in 
Sanskrit: kåraˆabhåvåt sat kåryam. This is ambiguous, and allows of at least three different 
interpretations:  
(1) "Because [the cause] is a cause, the product exists."  
(2) "Because [the product] is [identical with] the cause, the product exists."  
(3) "Because of the existence of the cause, the product exists." 
 Only the Jayama∫galå appears to opt for interpretation (3), in the following obscure 
passage: 
 
kåraˆabhåvåc ceti: kåraˆasya sattvåd ity artha˙. yady asat kåryam utpadyate kim iti? 
kåraˆåd eva na kåryasya bhåvo bhavati, bhavati ca. tasmåc chaktirËpeˆåvasthitam 
iti gamyate. 
"Kåraˆabhåvåc ca means: because of the existence of the cause. If it is asked: ‘the 
product, [though] non-existent, comes into being, what [is the consequence]?’ [54] 
[then the answer is:] ‘The product does not exist as a result of the cause only, and 
yet it exists. It is therefore understood that [the product] is present [in the cause] in 
the form of a potency.’"1 
                                                
1 I thank Professor Wezler for help in interpreting this passage. 
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The logic of this argument is not fully clear to me. It may be something like this: The very 
fact that there can be a cause implies that there must be a product. Understood in this way 
interpretation (3) is not very different from interpretation (1).2 
 Most of the surviving commentaries on the Såµkhyakårikå prefer interpretation (2). 
They all seem to agree that the product is identical with the cause. The Gau∂apådabhå∑ya, 
for example, states: 
 
kåraˆaµ yallak∑aˆaµ tallak∑aˆam eva kåryam api  
"Whatever is the nature of the cause, the same is the nature of the effect" (tr. 
Mainkar).3  
 
The Må†harav®tti and the Såµkhyasaptativ®tti use practically the same words.4 The 
Jayama∫galå, having first presented interpretation (3), then gives, as an alternative, 
interpretation (2): yatsvabhåvaµ kåraˆaµ tatsvabhåvaµ kåryam.5 VÓCASPATI MIÍRA's 
Tattvakaumud¥ formulates the same position in the following words: ‘kåraˆabhåvåc ca’: 
kåryasya kåraˆåtmakatvåt. na hi kåraˆåd bhinnaµ kåryam, kåraˆaµ ca sat iti kathaµ 
tadabhinnaµ kåryam asat bhavet.6 The commentary translated by PARAMÓRTHA into 
Chinese appears to have adopted the same position.7 The Såµkhyav®tti edited under the 
name V2 by Esther A. SOLOMON seems to accept a variant of this interpretation. If we 
accept the corrections proposed by its editor, it reads: kåraˆabhåvåd iti: kåraˆe∑u pråg 
utpatte˙ sat kåryam iti. This suggest the interpretation: "Because [the product] is in the 
causes [before it comes into being], the product exists." 
[55] 
 The similarity between these commentaries is great, and it is not surprising that 
SOLOMON in her comparative study of the commentaries remarks (SOLOMON, 1974: 27): 
"kåraˆabhåvåt is similarly explained by all." This is not however fully correct. The 
                                                
2 Vaiße∑ikasËtra 1.2.1-2 read kåraˆåbhåvåt kåryåbhåva˙; na tu kåryåbhåvåt kåraˆåbhåva˙. In isolation this 
could be understood as a criticism of the Såµkhya argument kåraˆabhåvåt sat kåryam in interpretation (3). 
This would be surprising, since Vaiße∑ika did not confront the problem to which satkåryavåda is the Såµkhya 
response until the period following the composition of the Vaiße∑ikasËtra; see Bronkhorst, 1999: § II.9. 
However, it appears that these two sËtras must be read in the context of the immediately following ones, and 
have nothing whatsoever to do with the Såµkhya argument for satkåryavåda; see Oetke, 1999. 
3 Mainkar, 1964: 25-26. 
4 Sarma, 1922: 17: iha loke yallak∑aˆaµ kåraˆaµ tallak∑aˆaµ kåryaµ syåt; Solomon, 1973: 18: iha loke 
yallak∑aˆaµ kåraˆaµ tallak∑aˆaµ kåryam api bhavati. 
5 Satkårißarmå Va∫g¥ya, 1970:74. 
6 Jha, Sharma and Patkar, 1965: 47; Srinivasan, 1967: 98-101. 
7 Cp. Takakusu, 1904: 991: "L'effet est de la même espèce que la cause." 
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Yuktid¥pikå, the "most significant commentary on the Såµkhyakårikå", comments in a 
manner which allows us to conclude that it accepts interpretation (1). It states: 
 
‘kåraˆabhåvåc ca sat kåryam’: ihåsati kårye kåraˆabhåvo nåsti tadyathå 
vandhyåyå˙. asti ceha kåraˆabhåvas tantupa†ayo˙. tasmåt sat kåryam.8  
 
The explanation can be translated: 
 
"On the one hand (iha), something or somebody — as for example a barren woman 
— is not a cause in case there is no product. On the other hand (iha), from among 
the thread and the cloth [one of the two, viz. the thread] is a cause [because there is 
a product, viz. the cloth]. For this reason the product exists [while the cause is 
there]."  
 
In other words, without a product being there, a cause is not a cause; or, the other way 
round, because a cause is a cause, there must be a product. This is interpretation (1). 
 It is surprising that interpretation (2) is so strongly represented in the surviving 
literature of Såµkhya, and interpretation (1) so weakly. Interpretation (1) is of a type that is 
wide-spread in Indian philosophical literature, as we shall see below; this is not true of 
interpretation (2).  
 Let us now turn to the material presented in GRANOFF's article mentioned above. 
GRANOFF draws attention to a Buddhist text — ÍÓNTARAK›ITA's Tattvasaµgraha and its 
commentary Pañjikå by KAMALAÍÁLA — and to a number of Jaina texts which all cite and 
discuss Såµkhyakårikå 9, i.e. the Såµkhya arguments in defence of satkåryavåda. She 
argues convincingly that the Jaina texts follow here the lead of the Tattvasaµgraha. All 
these texts offer an interpretation of kåraˆabhåvåt which is close to what is offered in the 
Yuktid¥pikå. The Tattvasaµgraha, for example, gives the following explanation: 
[56] 
kåryasyaivam ayogåc ca kiµ kurvat kåraˆaµ bhavet/ tata˙ kåraˆabhåvo 'pi b¥jåder 
nåvakalpate//9  
"And because the product would in this way be impossible, what is it that the cause 
would produce? As a result the seed etc. cannot even be cause."  
 
The Pañjikå comments: 
 
asatkåryavåde sarvathåpi kåryasyåyogåt kiµ kurvat b¥jådi kåraˆaµ bhavet. tataß 
caivaµ ßakyate vaktum: na kåraˆaµ b¥jådi˙, avidyamånakåryatvåd, gaganåbjavad 
iti. na caivaµ bhavati, tasmåd viparyaya iti siddham: pråg utpatte˙ sat kåryam iti. 
                                                
8 Wezler and Motegi, 1998: 124 l. 6-8. 
9 Tattvasaµgraha 13; Dwarikadas Shastri, 1981: I: 26. 
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The logical proof contained in this passage can be translated as follows: 
 
"The seed etc. are no cause, because no product is present, like a lotus in the sky 
[which, being totally non-existent, is not accompanied by a product, and is therefore 
no cause]. However, it is not like this (i.e., seed is  a cause); therefore the reverse 
[must be true], and thus it is established that the product is present before it comes 
into being." 
 
ABHAYADEVA's Tattvabodhavidhåyin¥ cites the above verse from the Tattvasaµgraha and 
explains the last argument in exactly the same terms as the Pañjikå.10 But also 
PRABHÓCANDRA's Prameyakamalamårtaˆ∂a is clearly influenced by these two Buddhist 
texts when it states: b¥jåde˙ kåraˆabhåvåc ca sat kåryaµ kåryåsattve tadayogåt. tathå hi: na 
kåraˆabhåvo b¥jåde˙ avidyamånakåryatvåt kharavi∑åˆavat. tat siddham utpatte˙ pråk 
kåraˆe kåryam.11 In his Kumudacandra PRABHÓCANDRA explains the logic behind the 
argument: ‘kåraˆabhåvåc ca sat kåryam’. kåraˆabhåvo hi kåraˆatvam, tac ca 
nityasambandhitvåt kåryasambandham apek∑ate, na ca asatå gaganåmbhojaprakhyeˆa 
kåraˆasya kaßcit sambandha˙, ata˙ kåraˆe kåryaµ tådåtmyena vartate.12 
 GRANOFF sums up the arguments as follows (p. 583): "The Jain texts (and the 
Buddhist Tattvasaµgraha ...) agree that the argument is something like this: The product 
must exist, since we speak of a cause and causality is a relationship. A non-existent entity 
cannot be one term of a relationship. We do not see hare's horns [57] entering into any kind 
of relationship with anything. Therefore the product must exist in order for us to speak of 
something being a ‘cause’ at all." That is, they all follow interpretation (1) of the sentence 
kåraˆabhåvåt sat kåryam "Because [the cause] is a cause, the product exists." 
 Does this mean that these Jaina texts and the Tattvasaµgraha from which they 
borrowed have all undergone the influence, direct or indirect, of the Yuktid¥pikå? GRANOFF 
emphatically denies this: "the Jain texts show little or no awareness of the often unique 
arguments of the Yuktid¥pikå, which might lead to the further speculation that the 
Yuktid¥pikå was not a text whose theories were hotly debated outside Såµkhya circles" (p. 
582). With regard to the first four arguments presented in Såµkhyakårikå 9 she observes: 
"The Yuktid¥pikå ... deviates from the other interpretations [offered in the other 
commentaries on this text] considerably, but the Jain texts I have examined show absolutely 
no awareness of its arguments for much of the verse" (p. 583). 
                                                
10 Saµghavi & Doßi, 1924-1931: I: 283 l. 22-27. 
11 Kumar, 1990: 288 l. 9-11. 
12 Kumar, 1991: 353 l. 5-7. 
The last reason for satkåryavåda  5 
 
 
 All this means that the Tattvasaµgraha and the Jaina texts that borrow from it share 
the fifth argument in favour of satkåryavåda with the Yuktid¥pikå and with no other 
Såµkhya commentaries, but are totally ignorant of the first four arguments presented in that 
same Yuktid¥pikå. How is this to be explained? GRANOFF offers the following solution (p. 
583): "It seems ... likely that [these Jaina texts and the Tattvasaµgraha] derive their 
interpretation from some text that we no longer have at our disposal today." She adds (p. 
584): "There remains, then, considerable detective work to be done on this question." 
 Such detective work cannot be carried out here and now. It is however interesting to 
conclude that the Yuktid¥pikå appears not to have been the only text that followed 
interpretation (1). This is reassuring, because there are good reasons to believe that 
interpretation (1) was the original interpretation of the sentence kåraˆabhåvåt sat kåryam. 
 How can one know the original interpretation of an ambiguous sentence that allows 
of at least three interpretations? Several factors support interpretation (1), all of them based 
on other texts than the Såµkhyakårikå and its commentaries.13 One is that ÓRYADEVA's 
*Íataka, which is older than the Såµkhyakårikå, appears to contain the same argument, 
apparently in the same ambiguous form. Its commentator VASU, [58] by stating "If the pot 
does not pre-exist in earth, then earth could not become the cause of the pot", shows that he 
opted for interpretation (1). 
 More important is that the kind of argument embodied in interpretation (1) was 
widely used in Indian philosophy at the time when Såµkhya as a system was being created. 
For details I have to refer to my book Langage et réalité. Here I will merely cite a verse 
from NÓGÓRJUNA's MËlamadhyamakakårikå, which uses this argument: 
 
naivåsato naiva sata˙ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate/ asata˙ pratyaya˙ kasya sataß ca 
pratyayena kim//14 
"Neither of a non-existent nor of an existent object is a cause possible. Of which 
non-existent [object] is there a cause? And what is the use of an existent [object]?" 
 
We recognize the assumption which also underlies interpretation (1): for something to be a 
cause, there has to be a product, there and then. Once one accepts this assumption, one may 
be induced to drawing various counterintuitive conclusions: NÓGÓRJUNA that no cause can 
exist, the Såµkhyas their no less extraordinary position that the product is there before it 
has been produced. 
                                                
13 For details, see Bronkhorst, 1999. 
14 MadhK(deJ) 1.6. 
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 Is it possible to say more about the assumption underlying these and other 
arguments? GRANOFF formulates it as follows, as we have seen: "The product must exist, 
since we speak of a cause and causality is a relationship. A non-existent entity cannot be 
one term of a relationship. We do not see hare's horns entering into any kind of relationship 
with anything. Therefore the product must exist in order for us to speak of something being 
a ‘cause’ at all." This formulation takes care of the fifth argument in the Yuktid¥pikå which 
we also find in the Tattvasaµgraha and the Jaina texts considered, and also of 
NÓGÓRJUNA's above argument, and no doubt of many other arguments found in Indian 
philosophical texts of that period. However, there are textual passages which allow us to 
conclude that a formulation has to be accepted in which the parellelism between what we 
say and the situation described finds expression. An example is the following passage from 
ÍA‹KARA's BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya, which argues precisely in defense of the satkåryavåda: 
 
pråg utpatteß ca kåryasyåsattve utpattir akart®kå niråtmikå ca syåt/ utpattiß ca nåma 
kriyå, så sakart®kaiva bhavitum arhati gatyådivat/ kriyå ca nåma syåd akart®kå ceti 
viprati∑idhyeta/ gha†asya cotpattir ucyamånå na gha†akart®kå, [59] kiµ tarhy 
anyakart®kå iti kalpyå syåt/ ... / tathå ca sati gha†a utpadyate ity ukte kulålåd¥ni 
kåraˆåni utpadyante ity uktaµ syåt/ na ca loke gha†otpattir ity ukte kulålåd¥nåm apy 
utpadyamånatå prat¥yate/ utpannatåprat¥te˙/ 
"If the effect did not exist prior to its coming into being, the coming into being 
would be without agent and empty. For coming into being is an activity, and must 
therefore have an agent, like [such activities] as going etc. It would be contradictory 
to say that something is an activity, but has no agent. It could be thought that the 
coming into being of a jar, [though] mentioned, would not have the jar as agent, but 
rather something else. ... If that were true, one would say "the potter and other 
causes come into being" instead of "the jar comes into being". In the world 
however, when one says "the jar comes into being" no one understands that also the 
potter etc. come into being; for [these] are understood to have already come into 
being."15 
 
In other words, the situation described has to correspond to the way we describe it. This is 
also clear from the following verse that occurs in NÓGÓRJUNA's MËlamadhyamakakårikå: 
 
gamyamånasya gamane prasaktaµ gamanadvayam/ yena tad gamyamånaµ ca yac 
cåtra gamanaµ puna˙//  
"If there is a going of [a road] that is being gone, there would be two goings: that by 
which the [road] is being gone, and again the going on it."16 
 
                                                
15 Ía∫kara ad BrahmasËtra 2.1.18; cited and discussed in Bronkhorst, 1996: 2. 
16 MadhK(deJ) 2.5; cited and discussed in Bronkhorst, 1997: 34. 
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The only possible reason for thinking that there should be two goings is that the sentence 
describing the situation — something like "[the road] which is being gone, is being gone" 
(gamyamånaµ gamyate) — has the verb ‘going’ twice over. 
 In the light of these and similar reflections I have proposed to formulate the more or 
less hidden assumption behind all these arguments as follows: "the words of a sentence 
must correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute the situation described by that 
sentence";17 I call this the correspondence principle. It takes for granted that there is, at 
some particular time, a situation in which all the things that constitute it occur together, and 
this forced many Indian thinkers — among them [60] NÓGÓRJUNA and the Såµkhyas — 
to draw counterintuitive conclusions. 
 
 We cannot conclude this discussion without addressing the question as to why most 
of the commentaries of the Såµkhyakårikå have given an interpretation to the fifth 
argument different from the one originally intended. One answer may well be that the first 
and the fifth argument would otherwise be almost identical. The first argument, it may be 
recalled, reads: 
 
asadakaraˆåt [sat kåryam] 
"The product exists because one does not produce something that does not exist." 
 
One might elucidate the logic underlying this argument with the following variant of 
GRANOFF's above explanation: "The product must exist, since we speak of producing and 
producing something is a relationship (between the maker and the product, or between the 
making and the product). A non-existent entity cannot be one term of a relationship. 
Therefore the product must exist in order for us to speak of producing something at all." Or, 
using the correspondence principle, one might say that there must be something 
corresponding to the word ‘pot’ in the situation described by the statement "He produces a 
pot". Either way the argument presented is close to the the fifth argument in interpretation 
(1). 
 However, more may have been involved in the preference for interpretation (2). The 
commentaries that offer this interpretation in this way take position in an altogether 
different debate, which may have been initiated by the Vaiße∑ikas. One of the fundamental 
positions of this school of thought — one of its "axioms" — is that composite objects are 
different from their constituent parts.18 It may have arrived at this position as a result of 
                                                
17 Bronkhorst, 1996: 1; 1997: 32; 1999: § I.1. 
18 Bronkhorst, 1992. 
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opposing the Buddhist point of view according to which no composite objects but only their 
constituent parts exist. However this may be, once these points of view had been articulated 
in Indian philosophy, the Såµkhyas were more or less obliged to determine their own 
position in this controversy. They chose the position which maintains that composite 
objects and their constituent parts are not different from each other. Concretely speaking: a 
cloth is not different from the threads that constitute it. 
[61] 
 It will be clear that this position could easily be made to agree with the doctrine of 
satkåryavåda. The cloth is namely also the product of the threads, which are its cause. The 
doctrine of satkåryavåda states that the cloth is there, in the threads, at the time when it has 
not yet been made. The classical Såµkhya position regarding parts and wholes states that 
the cloth is not different from the threads that constitute it. Combined they state that the 
cloth is there, in the threads, because it is not really different from them. This is 
interpretation (2) of the Sanskrit phrase kåraˆabhåvåt sat kåryam. 
 It is doubtful whether this argument adds much in support of the satkåryavåda, but 
this may not have disturbed the Såµkhya commentators much. The main argument of this 
doctrine having been given already by the phrase asadakaraˆåt (see above), the new 
interpretation (2) of kåraˆabhåvåt sat kåryam made it possible to present supporting 
evidence from the Såµkhyakårikå for the position that parts and wholes are identical.  
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